Armstrong v Times Newspapers Ltd & Ors, Court of Appeal - Queen's Bench Division, December 17, 2004, [2004] EWHC 2928 (QB)
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Armstrong v Times Newspapers Ltd & Ors, Court of Appeal - Queen's Bench Division, December 17, 2004, [2004] EWHC 2928 (QB)
Case No: HQ04X01798
Neutral Citation Number: [2004] EWHC 2928 (QB)IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEQUEEN'S BENCH DIVISIONRoyal Courts of JusticeStrand, London, WC2A 2LLDate: 17/12/2004Before :THE HON. MR JUSTICE EADY- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Between :- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Richard Spearman QC and Matthew Nicklin (instructed by Schillings) for the ClaimantHeather Rogers (instructed by Gillian Phillips) for the DefendantsHearing dates: 30th November and 6th and 7th December 2004- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -JudgmentMr Justice Eady: Introduction1. If ever there was a case for isolating the ``real issues'' between the parties in a libel action and excising superfluous material, this surely is it. Some of the particulars pleaded in the defence go back for decades and others even to ancient Greece and Rome.2. The article complained of was published in The Sunday Times on 13th June 2004. It refers to, and apparently repeats, allegations or ``questions'' raised in a book of which the second Defendant, Mr David Walsh, is a co-author. It has been published in France under the title ``LA Confidentiel''. I ruled on 30th November 2004, in so far as the article may reflect upon the Claimant, Mr Lance Armstrong, in associating him with illicit performance-enhancing drugs, that it is capable only of imputing either ``guilt'' (in the sense of having taken such drugs) or, at the least, that there are reasonable grounds to suspect him of having taken such drugs. On that occasion, I indicated that I would give my reasons in writing, and that is one of the matters addressed in the course of this judgment. 3. The consequence of that ruling is that, for the purposes of the trial and the preparations leading up to it, there is no room for advancing a plea of justification in any lesser sense, such as was contemplated by Brooke LJ in Chase v News Group Newspapers [2003] EMLR 11 at [45]. He recognised that the sting of a libel may sometimes ``... mean that there are grounds for investigating whether [the claimant] has been responsible for such an act''. Depending on the circumstances, the exclusion of ``grounds for investigating'' may significantly reduce the scope for a plea of justification. 4. It is important to remember, however, that a judge should not exclude such a meaning, at the pleading stage, purely on grounds of case management. Such a step should only be taken if the judge is satisfied that the words complained of, taken as a whole and read in their context, are simply not capable of bearing a meaning at the lowest level of gravity. That is to say, I should only exclude such a meaning if it can be characterised as so far-fetched that a jury, properly directed, would be perverse to uphold it. The principle was concisely stated by Simon Brown LJ in Jameel v The Wall Street Journal Europe [2003] EWCA Civ 1694 at [14]:``It is a high threshold of exclusion. Ever since Fox's Act 1792 the meaning of words in civil as well as criminal libel proceedings has been constitutionally a matter for the jury. The judge's function is no more and no less than to pre-empt perversity''.5. There was some argument in the course of the hearing before me as to the precise nature of the third tier of gravity to which Brooke LJ was referring in Chase. He went on in [46] to attribute this tripartite gradation to the speech o...See the full content of this document
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